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Abstract: The high level of profits along with low levels of gross physical investment has been 
characterized as a puzzle in heterodox economics. One of the most extended answers at the 
firm level is that changes in corporate governance have altered the objectives of the firm 
towards profits, rather than growth. However, once it is acknowledged that investment 
becomes the basis upon which companies supply commodities as well as compete with other 
firms, an ever decreasing rate of investment should not be compatible with permanent high 
levels of profits. This is what we call the ‘supply-side’ face of the investment-profit puzzle. The 
article builds on the post-Keynesian theory of the firm and its investment decision and explores 
different answers already linked to the financialisation literature such as changes brought about 
by production outsourcing, increased market power, the attack on labor conditions and financial 
accumulation. Once these solutions are critically assessed, an extension to the theory is 
proposed in order to show that firm’s profitability has been detaching from its physical 
investment decisions.   
Keywords: Profit, Investment, Financialisation, Globalisation, Monopolisation. 
1. Introduction 
One of the salient features associated with the finance-dominated accumulation regime in 
developed economies has been the coexistence of high levels of aggregate profits with low levels 
of gross fixed investment (simply investment in the rest of the article); a ‘profits without 
accumulation’ situation which has been experienced by the economy in general (Cordonnier, 
2006) and the nonfinancial sector in particular (Durand & Gueuder, 2018, p. 127). According to 
Milberg and Winkler (2013, p. 218), this phenomenon “is well documented but not well 
theorized”, and has been defined as a puzzle by different scholars as it runs counter to economic 
intuition (Epstein, 2015; Orhangazi, 2018; Stockhammer, 2005, 2008). 
Besides the conceptual framework or theory, investment is, at the same time, a source of 
effective demand as well as an addition to current and future capacity which allows the firm to 
produce and compete with others. Therefore, in relation to profits, investment represents a 
realization of present profits and is a basis upon which future profits will be made. Moreover, 
the quest for profitability is a fundamental determinant of investment, while different theories 
in mainstream and non-mainstream economics indicate that profits also serve as a preferred 
source to finance investment, compared to external ones. 
Figure 1 illustrates these various relations in a very abstract way, i.e., setting aside whether they 
operate at the micro or macro level as well as the possible inconsistencies among them (for this, 
see Seccareccia, 2010). For instance, the theory of loanable funds would posit the second arrow 
as the causality at the macro level. For the post-Keynesian theory, on the contrary, “it is clear 
that capitalists may decide to consume and to invest more in a given period than in the 
preceding one, but they cannot decide to earn more. It is, therefore, their investment and 
consumption decisions which determine profits, and not vice versa” as famously put by Kalecki 
(1954/2010, p. 46). Therefore, in the post-Keynesian framework, arrow 3 is the relevant one at 





The four channels indicate that profits and investment have a double sided relation which should 
be positive. This is why a weakening link between them since the 1980s represents a very 
puzzling situation. By looking at Figure 1 we can also realize that, rather than being a puzzle, the 
current weakening relation in fact involves various puzzles simultaneously that correspond to 
each arrow. These questions are: a) why are firms not investing in spite of high profitability?, b) 
what are they doing with those funds?, c) which alternative sources of effective demand 
compensate the reduction of investment at the aggregate level? and d) how can they remain 
profitable with their capacity to supply goods and one of their main weapons in competition 
diminished? 
At the aggregate level (answering question c), different post-Keynesian studies have analyzed 
the sources of effective demand that compensate the reduction of investment in the 
macroeconomic level, following Kalecki’s profit equation (Kalecki, 1954/2010 ch. 3). Examples 
of this are the increase in capitalists’ consumption (Cordonnier, 2006), expenditures cascades 
(Behringer & Van Treeck, 2013; Frank et al., 2014) or government deficits and external surpluses 
(Van Treeck, 2009). 
At the firm level, the post-Keynesian literature has analyzed the puzzle largely as an outcome of 
the introduction of the maximization of shareholder value as guiding principle of corporate 
behavior. According to this narrative, the hostile take-over movement and changes in payment 
structure in the 1980s aligned managers’ interests with those of shareholders, shifting firms’ 
goals of retaining and reinvesting towards downsizing and distributing (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 
2000). These changes are usually referred to as the financialisation of the firm (Van der Zwan, 
2014) -the definition followed in this paper- and have spurred several empirical studies which 
showed its negative consequences on real investment (Barradas, 2017; Clévenot et al., 2010; 
Hecht, 2014; Orhangazi, 2008; Stockhammer, 2004; Tori & Onaran, 2018b). 
However, within a firm-level analysis, in this paper we will show that the theoretical problem of 
the financialisation explanation is that while it can answer questions a) and b), it provides no 
solution and actually goes against question d). The narrative needs to account not only for the 
distribution of funds to shareholders instead of, but also in spite of not investing them; and 
hence needs to be necessarily linked to other explanations at the firm-level. Moreover, the 
macro-oriented solutions are insufficient as they explain the sustained demand for goods and 
services but not how firms are still able to adequately deliver them in the first place. Overlooking 
the question concerning firms´ ability to remain profitable with a reduced capacity to supply 
goods and one of their main weapons in competition diminished is what we call the supply-side 
face of the investment-profit puzzle. 
We will base our analysis on the post-Keynesian theory of the firm and its investment decision, 
presented by Wood (1975) and continued by Lavoie (1992) and others, to illustrate that in order 
to maintain high levels of profit with low levels of investment, the supply-side face of the 
investment-profit puzzle has to be properly addressed. That means coupling financialisation 
with other sources of productive capacity and competitive skills achieved by the firm that allow 
it to increase production and/or prices and/or reduce costs per unit of investment. 
In this paper we discuss a (non-exhaustive) list of answers which have already been associated, 




the shift towards financial accumulation are the main explanations found in the literature. The 
former is a salient feature associated with financialisation as a regime of accumulation (Hein, 
2010; Hein & Vogel, 2008; Onaran et al., 2011; Stockhammer, 2008; Stockhammer et al., 2009), 
while the latter is sometimes used even as a synonym for the financialisation of the firm (see 
Rabinovich, 2019). We also discuss the links between financialisation and outsourcing (Auvray 
& Rabinovich, 2019; Durand & Gueuder, 2018; Milberg, 2008; Milberg & Winkler, 2009, 2013), 
increasing market power (Durand & Gueuder, 2018; Durand & Milberg, 2019; Orhangazi, 2018) 
and, finally, the possibility that the puzzle is an accounting artifact. With these insights we 
propose an extension to the Post-Keynesian model of the firm that captures the increasing 
decoupling of firm’s profitability from its gross fixed investment decisions.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revises the post-Keynesian theory of the firm and 
its investment decision under financialisation together with the empirical literature that 
supports it. Section 3 presents the supply-side face of the investment-profit puzzle, while Section 
4 discusses possible answers. Section 5 integrates them into the model and reformulates it. We 
finally provide some concluding remarks. 
2. The post-Keynesian theory of the firm and its investment 
decision under different regimes of accumulation 
2.1. Theoretical insights 
The representative firm analyzed in post-Keynesian economics is what Eichner (1976) defined 
as the ‘megacorp’, an organization characterized by a) a separation of management from 
ownership, b) carrying its production within multiple plants, and c) operating in an oligopoly 
market and setting prices, rather than taking them as given. In fact, price competition tries to 
be avoided in oligopolistic markets given its harmful effects on profits. As Baran and Sweezy 
(1966, p. 63) put it, “price competition is normally taboo in oligopolistic situations” so 
competition is shifted to other tools such as advertising, sales campaigns and innovation 
(Kalecki, 1954/2010). 
While neoclassical models based on Tobin’s q (Brainard & Tobin, 1968) are derived from a 
standard model of a perfectly competitive firm that maximizes shareholders’ net wealth over 
multiple periods of time and faces adjustment costs in changing its capital stock (Hayashi, 1982), 
the post-Keynesian theory has a different perspective. Rather than maximizing profits under 
technological constraints as in neoclassical economics, firms maximize growth under financing 
constraints (Melmiès, 2016, p. 159).1 Investment therefore allows firms to fulfill its main 
objective of growth. Besides the role given to unexpected changes and institutional factors that 
could originate swings in investment -the so-called “animal spirits”-, the post-Keynesian 
literature recognizes that investment is largely determined by the fact that it provides the 
capacity to produce the goods needed to fulfill the expected growth in demand (Eichner, 1976; 
Wood, 1975).  
                                                          
1 The idea of maximization is contested. In a context of fundamental uncertainty, the firm may seek overall 




Another determinant of investment decisions is the possibility to finance it, as we said. Internal 
funds have a more relevant role for post-Keynesian theory vis-à-vis neoclassical. Contrary to the 
Modigliani-Miller (1958) principle of capital structure irrelevance for which investment decisions 
are independent of financial factors, Kalecki (1954/2010) early identified the importance of 
financing constrains and, specially, the role of internal funds or firm’s gross savings for 
investment decisions, what he called the entrepreneurial capital. In the works of Eichner (1976) 
and Wood (1975) the profit margin is set, for instance, according to the necessity to finance 
investment.2 These internal funds additionally determine the amount a firm is able to borrow 
following a principle of ‘increasing risk’: higher leverage gives more volatility and uncertainty to 
future earnings, whilst it also increases the risk of capital loss in the event of bankruptcy (Wood, 
1975, p. 30). 
These various constraints and determinants surrounding investment decisions were put 
together by Wood (1975), Eichner (1976), Harcourt and Kenyon (1976) and later synthetized by 
Lavoie (1992) based on Wood’s formulation and other post-Keynesians and Institutionalists 
(Penrose, 1959; Sylos-Labini, 1971). The general framework regarding the theory of the firm’s 
investment decision is therefore presented in a two-curve graphical analysis that picks on the 
two main determinants we have briefly discussed: the financing of investment –represented as 
a finance frontier (FF)– and the growth possibilities –represented as an expansion frontier (EF)– 
following Lavoie’s terminology. Additionally, the model is thought for the long run, at least in its 
original formulation by Wood, defined as three-to-five year moving average (Wood, 1975, p. 2) 
and at normal capacity use (Wood, 1975, p. 61). 
Before going to the presentation and discussion of both curves, it is important to clarify one 
distinction between early post-Keynesian’s formulations (Eichner, 1976; Galbraith, 1968; 
Harcourt & Kenyon, 1976; Wood, 1975) and those coming later (Dallery, 2009; Dallery & Van 
Treeck, 2011; Hein & Van Treeck, 2010; Lavoie, 1992, 2014; Stockhammer, 2004, 2005). Early 
post-Keynesians stated that the objective of the firm is to grow in terms of sales -gross or net- 
(Eichner, 1976, p. 23; Galbraith, 1968, p. 200; Wood, 1975, p. 62). In Wood’s model, for instance, 
this variable is endogenous (see for example Wood, 1975, p. 83). Investment is defined by an 
‘investment coefficient’ that indicates the amount of investment needed to obtain the growth 
in sales defined by the model. In later post-Keynesians analysis, growth is defined as capital 
accumulation. The difference may seem trivial but its relevance will become clear once we 
develop our critique in Sections 3 and 4. In the rest of this section we will follow Lavoie (2014) 
and specially Dallery’s (2009) notation in order to discuss the current state of the theory.  
The FF represents the finance constrain of the firm and shows the maximum level of investment 
that can be achieved with a certain amount of profits or, similarly, the minimum amount of profit 
needed to carry out an investment project. It is derived, basically, from a relation between 
sources and uses of funds: 𝑠𝑓(Π − 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑥𝑠𝐼 + 𝑥𝑑𝐼 = 𝐼 + 𝑥𝑓𝐼                                                   (1) 
                                                          
2 And this is why both of them belong to what has been termed the ‘investment financing’ theory of profits which is 
a different theory of profit margins from that of other early post-Keynesians such as Kalecki and Robinson (for a 




The left side of equation (1) represents the sources of funds where 𝑠𝑓 is the retention ratio, Π 
firm’s profits, 𝑖 the interest rate, 𝐷 issued debt, 𝐼 net physical investment and 𝑥𝑠 and 𝑥𝑑 are, 
respectively, net new equity and net new debt, expressed as a ratio of net physical investment.  
The right side of equation (1) represents the uses of funds where, apart from net physical 
investment, 𝑥𝑓 represents net financial investment as a ratio of net physical investment. 
Equation (2) is obtained by dividing everything by the stock of capital and rearranging terms, 
which gives the equation of the FF: 
𝑟 = 𝑔 (1 + 𝑥𝑓 − 𝑥𝑠 − 𝑥𝑑𝑠𝑓 ) + 𝑖𝑑                                                    (2) 
Where r = Π /K, g = I/K and d = D/K. Equation (2) indicates a positive relation between investment 
and profits since, as the latter grows, the firm is able to finance an increasing amount of 
investment. A higher retention ratio (𝑠𝑓), net equity (𝑥𝑠) or debt (𝑥𝑑) issued will allow the firm 
to achieve higher levels of investment with a certain amount of profits while growing financial 
investment (𝑥𝑓) or interest payments (𝑖𝑑) will go in the opposite direction. These parameters 
should therefore be interpreted as targeted values that will allow the firm to grow at a pace g.   
The other constituent of firm’s investment decision is the EF which gives the maximum rate of 
profit that can be expected at a certain level of accumulation. The literature usually portrays it 
with a concave shape and a positive slope segment in order to indicate that, up to a certain 
point, there is a positive relation between expected profits and investment due to dynamic 
economies of scale and scope that allow firms to obtain higher profit rates with increasing 
accumulation.3 However, beyond that point a negative relation arises because of two reasons. 
First, due to the limitations of management to handle the speed of expansion (the Penrose 
effect). Second, because the firm would expect reduced profit rates if it wants to grow at higher 
rates and compete for market share with other firms. It is usually assumed that the firm decides 
in the segment of the curve where the trade-off exists since, before that point, it can achieve 
higher rates of growth and profit at the same time. 
Figure 2 illustrates both curves and the broad different equilibriums that might appear under 
two regimes of accumulation: M (for Managerial Capitalism) and F (for Financialisation). This 
distinction recognizes the changes brought about by financialisation in the relations among 
different groups within the firm which motivated further developments in the post-Keynesian 
theory of the firm (Dallery, 2009; Dallery & Van Treeck, 2011; Hein & Van Treeck, 2010; 
Stockhammer, 2004, 2005). 
[FIGURE 2] 
Ending in M or F depends on the power struggle between shareholders and managers according 
to Stockhammer (2004). He assumes that while the former focus on profit, the latter prefer 
growth. The equilibrium M associated with r* and g* belongs to the so-called managerial 
capitalism, where managers have a higher degree of freedom from shareholders in order to 
pursue growth strategies. Consequently, they may choose (g*, r*) that maximizes the rate of 
                                                          
3 In Wood’s original formulation, the EF (or opportunity frontier as he defined it), was concave but did not have a 




growth of the firm given the finance constrain. On the contrary, when shareholders become 
more powerful, that is, when the firm financialises, they can force managers to follow a lower 
growth strategy, g** associated with a higher rate of profit, r**. 
However, as noted by Dallery (2009), financialisation has further implications for the firm, in 
particular for parameters in equation (2) (Figure 3). Shareholders do not necessarily consider 
the profit rate, or the whole amount of profits earned by the firm, as their main objective but, 
rather, the part of those profits that can be claimed by them, the free cash flows (FCF). 
Graphically, the maximization of FCF (𝑔𝐹𝐶𝐹, 𝑟𝐹𝐶𝐹) implies maximizing the gap between the FF 
and the EF, determining the retention ratio (𝑠𝑓) as a residual. Without reaching that extreme 
point, shareholders might push for higher dividends (lower 𝑠𝑓), lower issuance of net new equity 
(lower 𝑥𝑠) or greater indebtedness (higher 𝑑). All in all, these different alternatives will shift the 
FF upwards with the associated (𝑔1, 𝑟1). 
Finally, shareholders might also be interested in maximizing the firm’s value on the market. In 
this case, since firm’s value has a positive relation with its growth, shareholders also have to 
take into account capital accumulation. Considering that the maximization of firm’s value implies 
calculations over an infinite span of time and the absence of relevant knowledge in order to do 
so, firms follow rules of thumb such as the well-know 15% return on equity (Dallery, 2009, p. 
511). The result of this strategy of maximizing shareholder’s wealth might imply a combination 
similar to (𝑔1, 𝑟1). Whether the final location is (𝑔𝐹𝐶𝐹, 𝑟𝐹𝐶𝐹) or (𝑔1, 𝑟1) will depend on the 
objectives of shareholders: the more short-termed, the closer to (𝑔𝐹𝐶𝐹, 𝑟𝐹𝐶𝐹). 
[FIGURE 3] 
After presenting the post-Keynesian theory of the firm and its investment decisions under 
financialisation, the next section will revise the empirical literature that deals with the effect of 
financialisation on investment. 
2.2. Empirical findings  
As it is presented in Equation (1), the literature recognizes two broad channels by which 
investment is affected. The first, what Fiebiger (2016) calls the drain side of financialisation, has 
implied a heightened transfer of earnings from non-financial corporations to financial markets 
through stock buybacks, interest and dividend payments. The definition we are following of 
financialisation -the negative consequences of the maximization of shareholder value- is 
basically represented by this channel. The second channel, what Fiebiger (2016) calls the pull 
side of financialisation, and Rabinovich (2019) partly refers as the financial turn of accumulation 
hypothesis, has implied an enlarged acquisition of financial assets from which NFCs derive a 
growing proportion of financial income. This channel is reminiscent as well of Krippner’s 
definition of financialisation where “profit-making occurs increasingly through financial 
channels rather than trade and commodity production” (2005, p. 181). 
Whether the drain side or the pull side, the idea is that both channels have a negative impact 
since financial payouts, including interest expenses, represent a drain of resources that could be 
used for investment purposes while financial income is obtained from financial investment 
which crowds out real investment. Following these hypothesis, a prolific empirical literature, 




estimating those channels. Most studies have been restricted to advanced economies and, 
among them, especially the USA. For this country, studies using aggregate data find negative 
effects for both channels on capital accumulation which are not always significant nevertheless 
(Onaran et al., 2011; Stockhammer, 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015; Van Treeck, 2008). 
Similar findings are reported on studies using firm level data (Auvray & Rabinovich, 2019; Davis, 
2017; Hecht, 2014; Orhangazi, 2008; Schoder, 2014), while additionally showing differentiated 
effects according to the size of the firm. For bigger firms, Orhangazi (2008) finds that financial 
payouts and financial income present a negative and significant effect on capital expenditures 
which is 50% higher than for small firms. Davis (2017) also finds a negative and significant effect 
of financial payouts for larger firms. From a mainstream perspective, Gutiérrez and Phillipon 
(2017) show that investment is weak relative to Tobin’s q since the early 2000s and find tighter 
governance to be significant both at the industry and firm level. This tighter governance is 
related to those changes in corporate governance that promote buybacks as in the 
financialisation literature.  
Without relying on econometric studies, Krippner (2005, p. 185) documents an increase in the 
proportion of financial income which, according to her measure, has gone from less than 10% in 
1950 to 40% in 2001. In their highly-cited paper Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) indicate how, 
during the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the principle of retain and reinvest shifted towards 
downsize and distribute. Consequently, an increased proportion of funds started to be 
transferred to shareholders through dividends and, especially for the USA, share buybacks 
expanded in detriment of investment in physical capital and human resources. 
Findings for other advanced and even emerging countries go in similar direction. For the latter, 
Demir (2009) documents negative effects of the financial income channel for a panel of 
Argentinian, Mexican and Turkish firms. Stockhammer (2004) showed, using national accounts 
data, that increased financial income in the UK and France has been associated with lower rates 
of capital formation. The same finding, as well as for financial payouts, was derived from firm-
level data in the UK and European countries by Tori and Onaran (2018a, 2018b). Barradas (2017), 
also with European firm-level data, finds positive effects of financial income and negative of 
payouts for capital accumulation. Similar differential effects in terms of positive financial income 
and negative financial payouts were found by Seo, Kim and Kim (2016) for a panel of Korean 
firms. Hecht (2014) used firm level data from China, France, Germany, Great Britain, India and 
Japan and found negative effects of financial profit in China, France, Germany, India and the 
USA. For France, Clévenot, Guy and Mazier (2010) measure financialisation by firms’ financial 
asset accumulation and find it not to be negatively related to investment.  
Besides the fact that all papers find at least one channel negatively affecting investment, the 
effect of the financial payout channel tends to be more robust through the literature, while the 
financial income channel is found to be positive in some papers (Auvray & Rabinovich, 2019; 
Barradas, 2017; Hecht, 2014; Orhangazi, 2008; Seo et al., 2016). However, even when focusing 
mainly on financial payouts, the vast majority of the changes taken into account in the 
investment-profit relation seem to be limited to the FF, as it is clear both from the theoretical 
and empirical review.4 Still, it should also be taken into account whether or not these changes 
                                                          




in the FF are sustainable from the point of view of the EF. This is at the core of what we defined 
as the supply-side face of the investment-profit puzzle and next section deals with it.  
3. Still a (supply-side face of the) puzzle 
In spite of the various empirical findings that confirm the trade-off between payouts and 
investment previously exposed, other theoretical problems arise and have been surprisingly 
under-studied. 
As Dallery (2009, pp. 500–501) correctly puts it: “it seems that the trade-off is not between 
profits and investment, or between profit rate and accumulation rate. The trade-off under study 
may be between today’s profitability and tomorrow’s profitability. Considering this trade-off 
raises the puzzling question of shareholders preferences in terms of accumulation, because 
tomorrow’s profitability depends on today’s accumulation”. Similarly, Lavoie (2014, p. 136) also 
states that “[p]rofitability and expansion are thus tightly related. Firms can grow because they 
make profits that allow them to finance their expansion. But, reciprocally, the growth of firms 
allows them to be profitable.”  
As we indicated in Figure 1, investment not only provides the possibility to expand capacity but 
serves as well as a competitive weapon in the struggle against other firms. Wood (1975, p. 68), 
for example, clearly highlights this aspect: “Investment expenditures thus play a double role, a 
fact of which companies are well aware. On the one hand it provides the extra capacity needed 
to supply any given increase in demand. On the other, it is a way of improving the firm’s 
efficiency or ‘trade position’ – a weapon in the competitive struggle to attract demand at the 
expense of other firms.” Moreover, according to Eichner (1976, p. 88), investment is not just 
another weapon in competition but it actually replaces price competition under oligopolistic 
conditions. 
The work done by Crotty (1993, 2017), Crotty and Goldstein (1992) and Goldstein (2009) picks 
on this aspect of investment. Their growth-safety model identifies the different dimensions 
related to investment decisions we have discussed so far: the need to grow and to finance that 
growth along with the risks that finance implies. Management seeks growth and safety, being 
positively and negatively associated with investment respectively. The negative relation with 
safety is because investment has to be financed and, eventually, management's autonomy 
and/or the survival of the firm can be threatened by shareholders or creditors. However, if the 
intensity of competition reaches a point in which the results are not minimally acceptable, a 
managerial firm does not decrease investment given that it has an imperative to survive. 
Therefore, it will engage in “a coercive invest-or-die model” (Crotty, 1993, p. 16) as many US 
firms did in the 1970s and part of the 1980s according to this narrative. 
However, this explanation does not seem to be valid nowadays since it stresses the 
determinants of high investment with low profits while the current situation is the opposite. As 
put by Baragar and Chernosmas (2012, p. 35), “[w]ith high profits, low interest rates, and large 
quantities of retained corporate earnings, firms are clearly not financially constrained from 
undertaking additional investment projects. Substantial positive net savings by these 
corporations also suggest internally determined investment restraint... In short, Crotty’s dual 




Besides being considered in some analysis, the little attention received by the ‘supply-side’ face 
of the puzzle is probably related to the fact that post-Keynesian economics focuses rather on 
the ‘demand-side’ of investment. This may explain why studies on the mechanisms that allow 
profits to remain high despite low levels of investment have relied on the alternative sources of 
effective demand that compensate the reduction of investment at the macroeconomic level. 
These other sources of effective demand can be traced down to Kalecki’s profit equation 
(1954/2010 ch. 3) and Erdös & Molnár (1980) distinction between paper and material profits, 
i.e., profits generated by trade surplus and budget deficit vs. investment and consumption 
respectively. Consequently, theoretical and empirical work has been done on the increase in 
consumption, fuelled either by capitalist expenditures and/or debt (Behringer & Van Treeck, 
2013; Cordonnier, 2006; Cordonnier & Van de Velde, 2014; Cynamon & Fazzari, 2008; Dallery & 
Van Treeck, 2011; Frank et al., 2014) as well as government deficits and external surpluses 
(Cordonnier, 2006; Stockhammer, 2008; Van Treeck, 2009).5 
Although these are necessary conditions at the macroeconomic level, from a ‘supply-side’ point 
of view, the maintenance of high profits with low investment is still puzzling. The insufficiency 
of the demand-side explanations relies on the fact that, while they account for the maintenance 
of a demand for the goods and service produced by firms, they cannot explain how firms are still 
able to adequately supply them. Figure 4 takes the example of US firms to illustrate this point. 
All rates with the exception of gross average accumulation show a declining trend since the 
1980s, with even negative rates for the median net accumulation since the early 2000s. Taking 
the case of the median as an example of a representative firm, a permanent reduction in its own 
productive facilities should eventually endanger its capacity to produce those commodities from 
which profits are obtained as well as weaken its competitive position against other firms.6 
[FIGURE 4] 
This outcome can be represented in terms of the model in Figure 5. The fact that not only 
accumulation has continued decreasing since the formulations of the model under 
financialisation by Stockhammer (2004) and Dallery (2009)7 -graphically, 𝑔∗∗ moving to 𝑔∗∗∗-  but 
also that some of the sharpest decreases happened after the Great Recession (Figure 4) puts 
forward the puzzling question of how firms avoided a downward shift in their EF. That means, 
how decreasing capacity to supply goods and compete with other firms brought about by feeble 
accumulation did not eventually endanger their profitability. Far from this outcome, in a paper 
dedicated exclusively to discuss trends, measurement and drivers of the rate of profit in the USA 
(to continue with the example we took), Basu and Vasudevan (2012) show that, except in one 
measure, there was a break in the declining trend in profitability in the early 1980s followed 
either by an increasing or trendless period. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows similar trends.  
[FIGURE 5] 
                                                          
5 The kind of macroeconomic analysis we make reference to should not be confused with that which studies different 
types of macroeconomic regimes under financialisation (such as Boyer, 2000; Hein & Van Treeck, 2010). 
6 Unless all firms are doing the same. However, this has not been the case worldwide. 
7 It could be argued that, by the time Stockhammer (2004) and Dallery (2009) wrote their papers, the rate of 
accumulation was not g** but a higher one and, since that moment, it has been decreasing towards g**. But then 




In the next section we will review the different answers found in the literature. 
4. Solutions to the puzzle 
Sticking strictly to the model we discussed so far as well as the two properties of investment at 
the firm level from a supply-side point of view (capacity + competitive weapon), the answer for 
sustained high levels of profitability (and also payouts) with permanent low or even negative 
levels of net accumulation should be found in a combination of three elements. Firms ought to 
obtain increases in production and/or prices and/or decreases in costs per unit of investment, 
basically an increase in profits per unit of investment. Graphically, this implies an upward shift 
of the EF.  
At this point, the distinction between growth in sales and growth in investment mentioned in 
Section 2 becomes more relevant. This is because the solution to the supply-side face of the 
investment-profit puzzle partly involves being able to sustain growth in revenue with a lower 
amount of investment. Whereas in the mid-1970s it could be argued “that the maximization of 
the rate of growth of sales or assets is a close approximation to the maximization of the growth 
of the corporate levy, and all three maximands can in most cases be used interchangeably.” 
(Eichner, 1976, p. 24), this does not seem to be the case anymore. While Figure 4 indicated a 
decreasing rate of net (and sometimes gross) accumulation for US firms, Figure 6 shows that this 
did not happen hand in hand with a similar trend in the growth of sales. For a sample of firms 
with positive growth (65.9% of the total), the rate of growth in real sales in fact increased. For 
the whole sample of firms, growth remained roughly constant, when computed for the median, 
and only decreased for a weighted average. Alternative measures such as sales growth relative 
to investment (Figure A2) and sales per unit of investment (Figure A3) portray a similar picture. 
It should also be stressed that once the distinction between growth in sales and growth in capital 
stock is acknowledged, it is doubtful that managers had abandoned their growth (in sales) 
preferences. 
[FIGURE 6] 
Having shown that a lower or even negative growth in net accumulation has not been matched 
by a similar trend in growth in sales -at least in the US setting-, we will next review some 
potential explanations for this phenomenon as well as the other possible answers we 
mentioned: increases in price and/or decreases in costs per unit of investment. All of them have 
already been associated, to different degrees, with the financialisation literature in general and 
that of the firm in particular -although not explicitly acknowledging them as a solution to the 
type of question raised in this article. 
a. Worsening labor conditions and financial accumulation 
We put together these answers not because they are necessarily related to each other, but due 
to the fact that they are the two main explanations provided by the financialisation literature to 
the supply-side face of the puzzle. Dallery (2009) claims that the EF can be shifted upwards by 
worsening labor conditions. The attack on wages and labor conditions with the distributive 
changes it brought about are one of the salient features associated with financialisation (Hein, 




This answer is relevant for cost management but nevertheless seems unable to explain a firm’s 
capacity to sustain permanent or increasing growth in sales. One way around this problem is by 
linking increased wage pressure and labour flexibility to a higher utilisation rate and a more 
intensive use of productive capacities, as done by Dallery (2009).  
Another widespread alternative provided by the financialisation literature is a higher proportion 
of financial profits generated by NFCs due to their investment in financial assets (Davis, 2016; 
Krippner, 2005), what Rabinovich (2019) calls the financial turn of accumulation hypothesis. 
Stockhammer (2004, p. 727), for example, puts together the increased profitability and 
distribution of funds to shareholders along with a turn to financial accumulation: “[i]f our story 
were true, one would expect that managers and consequently non-financial businesses to 
identify increasingly as rentiers and hence also to behave as such. We should expect higher 
dividend payout, lower growth and more financial investment by nonfinancial businesses.” 
Translating this hypothesis into the model, the idea would be that financial accumulation does 
not only affect the FF but also the EF by providing alternative sources of profits. 
However, Fiebiger (2016) asserts that, for the USA, FDI is classified as a financial asset in the 
national accounts, thus used as evidence for financial accumulation when its increase would 
rather support the thesis of an internationalization of the NFC (as it will be shown in the next 
section). In a similar fashion, Rabinovich (2019) shows, also for the USA, that the empirical 
evidence to sustain the idea of a financial accumulation is misguided as it mistakenly considers 
some assets to be financial (intangibles, goodwill, FDI), also inaccurately assumes some types of 
income to be financial (dividends from domestic and international subsidiaries) and 
overestimates the weight of that income in total income (3.5% at most, not 40%). Nevertheless, 
this overestimation at the macroeconomic level does not deny that certain NFCs do pursue a 
business model oriented towards financial accumulation (Froud et al., 2006). 
b. Production outsourcing 
The pioneering works of Milberg (2008) and Milberg and Winkler (2009, 2013) addressed the 
relation between outsourcing of production and financialisation: by outsourcing production, 
firms decrease their need to invest, being therefore able to distribute those funds to 
shareholders. Further work in this direction has been done by Fiebiger (2016, pp. 360–361) who 
indicated that “the claim of the shareholder value literature that managers of US NFCs 
abandoned their growth preference cannot be asserted without considering the sector’s entire 
operations.” Auvray and Rabinovich (2019) show that the negative correlation between payouts 
and investment is stronger for those US firms belonging to high offshoring sectors.  
Studies on financialisation have traditionally focused on the relation between the ‘real’ and the 
financial sector and its effects on investment, paying comparatively less attention to other 
phenomena that might affect investment and profits such as the globalization of production. For 
example, Dallery (2009, p. 494) states that contrary to “Crotty (1993) who addresses 
globalization through increased competition, I approach here globalization through its second 
dimension: the increasing power of finance.” Krippner (2005) considers the claim that 
financialisation might reflect spatial relocation of production but dismisses it because results 
from domestic economy dominate the trend for the global measure. Also Duménil and Lévy 




scenario, make reference to investment and globalization of production. Yet, while the decrease 
in investment is associated with financialisation, globalization of production is associated with 
trade deficits in the US and global imbalances. 
However, explicitly taking into account the global nature of contemporary capitalism is a way to 
solve the ‘supply-side’ face of the investment-profit puzzle by allowing higher production (when 
it is done by other firms) and lower costs per unit of investment. The reconfiguration of global 
production has allowed big NFCs to focus on some activities considered as core or strategic 
(development and design, trans-divisional research, technology and business intelligence) while 
dropping the non-core ones, usually with low value creation (Gereffi et al., 2005; Lee & Gereffi, 
2015; Schwörer, 2013; Serfati, 2008). The latter are carried, most of the time, through arm-
length relations with various suppliers all over the world, over whom the leading firm establishes 
a monopsonic relation (Milberg & Winkler, 2013). As put by Dzarasov (2016, p. 148), 
“financialized corporations have largely shifted the burden of production to others.” These 
suppliers not only compete among each other but also face leader’s terms of payments, its 
standards of just-in-time production and absorb risks associated to the volatility of sales (Baud 
& Durand, 2012; Melmiès & Dallery, 2014). For the big NFC, outsourcing could therefore be 
thought of as a decision that has the benefits of investment (increased production) but without 
its costs (sinking funds). Through outsourcing, big NFCs smooth the dependence on their own 
internal productive capacity and hence their link between investment and profits.  
c. Increasing market power 
Big NFCs that outsource part of their production not only establish an asymmetric market 
structure with their various suppliers, but also manage to exercise increasing oligopoly power 
as sellers (Milberg & Winkler, 2013). In fact, since the 1990s, some trends have been pointing 
towards an increasing oligopolization of the economy. First, economic globalization, 
technological innovation and deregulation triggered a merger wave in the 90s with the European 
and Asian takeover market becoming more important and cross-border transactions growing 
substantially (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008), consequently increasing concentration levels 
and declining competition (Diez et al., 2019; Grullon et al., 2019; Kahle & Stulz, 2017). Second, 
there has also been an increase in the common ownership of competitor firms by a group of big 
institutional investors, therefore reducing their incentive to compete (Azar et al., 2018). Third, 
also since the mid-90s, there has been a growth in a historically-specific type of monopoly, 
related to the privatization of knowledge and its transformation into firms’ assets: intellectual 
monopolies (Pagano, 2014). 
In fact, different scholars have linked a rent-seeking strategy with intangible investment. 
Orhangazi (2018) identifies four distinct functions of intangible assets. First, intangible assets 
such as patents can generate absolute monopolies for certain products. Second, in industries 
such as high-technology and telecommunications they can act as barriers to entry. Third, assets 
like brand names and trademarks enhance pricing power. Finally, assets like copyrights for 
software can generate artificial scarcity for products that have a cost of reproduction that tends 
to zero. Schwartz (2016) and Durand and Milberg (2019) highlight the role of intangibles as 
enablers in the coordination of and value extraction from global value chains. While global 
competition pushes downward the share of value captured in the production segments, stricter 




part; marketing and after-sales in the last one) generating the so-called smile curve. Similarly, 
Rikap (2018) argues that leaders in global value chains appropriate the intellectual rents of the 
innovation networks they organize taking Apple as a case study. Both the rising role of intangible 
assets and mergers and acquisitions has been documented by Rabinovich (2019) for the US 
setting and offer another prospective way to solve the puzzle. 
d. Illusory puzzle 
Finally, it could be argued that part of the puzzle is rather related to different measurement 
issues. First, if calculated using national accounts, the puzzle could be exaggerated since 
investment done under FDI would be missing (Fiebiger, 2016). This is because, in the case of in-
house offshoring, investment carried out by international subsidiaries is still made by the firm 
but in a different country. Although this is an issue when using national accounts, it is not the 
case when working with consolidated financial statements for the parent company along with 
its national and international subsidiaries (as we did in Figures 4, 6 and the Appendix). 
Second, the decrease in the investment-profit ratio might be the side effect of the declining 
prices of investment goods relative to other prices in the economy (see for example Lian et al., 
2019). However, the highest decrease in relative prices is verified for machinery and equipment 
(excluding transportation) and, within this category, communications and computing equipment 
(Bachman, 2015; Lian et al., 2019, p. 81). As a consequence, it is only machinery and equipment 
(excluding transportation) where a decrease in the nominal investment-to-GDP ratio comes with 
a rise in the real measure. Moreover, this increase does not compensate for the real shrinkage 
in structures8 in advanced economies (Lian et al., 2019 see Annex 3.2). 
5. The model redefined 
The solutions to the supply-side face of the investment-profit puzzle discussed in the previous 
section lead us to the conclusion that firms have experienced non-negligible modifications in the 
EF. To recall, the upward-sloping part of the EF was related to the dynamic economies of scale 
and scope that allow a higher rate of profit with increasing accumulation. However, it will 
eventually reach a point where those economies of scale and scope end and the profit rate is 
maximized. Beyond that point, higher rates of accumulation imply entering in the downward-
slope of the EF where managerial inefficiencies show up (due to the size of the firm) as well as 
the need to reduce prices when fighting for market share. 
To the best of our knowledge, even though the different papers assume a concave shape, no 
one has provided a functional form for it. We propose one simple possibility, already dividing by 
the stock of capital, with the purpose of introducing the different variables that capture the 
dynamics we have been discussing so far. This is: 𝑟 = −𝜔. (𝑔 − 𝜇)2 + 𝐴                                                              (3) 
Equation (3) follows the definition of the expansion frontier: the maximum level of profit that 
can be expected by the firm at a given rate of investment. It is also flexible enough to represent 
                                                          




the different shapes of the EF, either with an increasing segment or not, by introducing only 
three variables affecting the relation between the rate of profit and accumulation. 
The first, 𝜇, represents the point where the economies of scale and scope related to increasing 
accumulation stop and the profit rate is maximized. If we go back to the distinction between 
managerial capitalism and financialisation, it could be argued that a rate of accumulation close 
to 𝜇  would be preferred by shareholders. 
The second new variable, 𝜔, captures the sensitivity of the profit rate to the current rate of 
accumulation: higher values of 𝜔 will make the profit rate more reactive to changes in the rate 
of accumulation. For simplicity we put only one variable even though it implies (rather 
unrealistically) symmetric upward and downward slopes. 
Finally, we include variable 𝐴 which captures other exogenous effects that shift the EF upwards 
or downwards. Higher values of 𝐴 mean firms are able to attain higher profitability at every 
single rate of accumulation. All the different solutions we found to the supply-side face of the 
investment-profit puzzle are mainly (but not only) represented by this variable. 
As previously noted, Dallery (2009) indicated that the EF can be shifted upwards due to wage 
contraction and higher capacity utilization. By providing an explicit functional form for the EF we 
are able to incorporate the broader spectrum of previously discussed options. While outsourcing 
increases production and decreases costs per unit of investment, intangible accumulation is 
associated with market power that increases prices per unit of investment. This is also the case 
of mergers and acquisitions. In terms of financial accumulation, firms lending to their clients are 
able to achieve higher sales. As a result, in these cases, the EF is shifted upwards (𝐴1 > 𝐴0). 
[FIGURE 7] 
However, it is also the case that the more a firm relies on external suppliers and the more it 
shifts to intangible or financial accumulation, the less responsive its current profit rate is to its 
tangible accumulation. In our model this implies a lower value of 𝜔 (𝜔1 < 𝜔0) which flattens 
the EF. Greater M&A activity will also affect the shape of EF in the case the firm is able to exploit 
economies of scale and scope. Figure 7 illustrates the new EF comparing it both with the original 
one and with that of Figure 5 (i.e., the result of a permanent decrease in investment without the 
solutions discussed so far). 
Likewise, the FF will also be affected. Besides the decision to offshore part of the production in 
arm-length basis which does not compromise internal funds, the choice to carry an intangible 
investment or acquire another company do represent additional uses of funds. Equation (4) 
illustrates this: 𝑠𝑓(Π − 𝑖𝐷) + 𝑥𝑠𝐼 + 𝑥𝑑𝐼 = 𝐼 + 𝑥𝑓𝐼 + 𝑥𝑖𝐼 + 𝑥𝑎𝑞𝐼                                         (4) 
This is the same equation as (1) but with those other uses indicated on the right side: 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑎𝑞 
are, respectively, intangible investment and acquisitions expressed as a ratio of net physical 
investment. We could also explicitly divide total profits (Π) into financial (Π𝑓) and nonfinancial 




constraint of the firm. For simplicity and in order to keep only one variable in the vertical axis 
we continue using total profits so the equation of the new FF will be: 
𝑟 = 𝑔 (1 + 𝑥𝑓 + 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑎𝑞 − 𝑥𝑠 − 𝑥𝑑𝑠𝑓 ) + 𝑖𝑑                                           (5) 
Positive values of either term will imply a higher slope of the FF, i.e., the level of physical 
investment that can be achieved with a certain amount of profits will be lower. It is worth 
highlighting that while the shift to intangible investment and the organization of global value 
chains represent novel phenomena and therefore were not considered by Wood’s original 
formulation, the cases of mergers and acquisition were discussed by the author but left aside as 
they were eventually considered irrelevant (Wood, 1975, pp. 20–24). However, the increasing 
role that mergers and acquisitions have nowadays requires us to explicitly take them into 
account. 
[FIGURE 8] 
Figure 8 shows the FF and the redefined EF redefined along with the case in which a firm 
increases payouts to shareholders and reduces investment. Starting from a specific 
accumulation and distribution rate (𝑔𝑎, 𝑟𝑎) the firm decides to permanently use a higher 
proportion of funds for distribution and less for investment, going therefore to (𝑔𝑏, 𝑟𝑏). Given 
the current way in which global production is organized, the firm is able to carry out this decision 
without threatening its rate of profit and, therefore, 𝑟𝑎 ≈ 𝑟𝑏. 
6. Conclusion 
Financialisation as a current stage of capitalism is characterized, among other things, by the 
concomitance of low levels of investment with constant or increasing profit rates in developed 
economies. Taking into account the expected positive relation among them, the current 
situation has been defined as the ‘investment-profit puzzle’. Once the different relations 
between profit and investment are taken into account, it can be seen that, at the firm level, the 
puzzle involves various puzzles or simultaneous questions: 1) why are not firms investing in spite 
of high profitability?, 2) what are they doing with those funds?, 3) how can they remain 
profitable with their capacity to supply goods and one of their main weapons in competition 
diminished? 
This article has not been the first to address these questions, not even to propose answers to 
them. The main contribution of this article has been, on the contrary, to show theoretically the 
need to provide comprehensive answers which are able to tackle, simultaneously, all the 
questions listed before. 
One common answer has emphasized the role played by the maximization of shareholder value 
as guiding principle for corporate governance, by downsizing and distributing -the definition of 
financialisation we have followed. The theoretical problem of this explanation is its inability to 
answer question 3), and thus the need to be linked with other reasons for firm’s maintained 
capacity to supply demanded goods and to compete with other firms, i.e., the two roles of 




This side of the puzzle can be solved by recognizing that nowadays big NFCs’ supply capacity and 
competitive abilities are becoming partly detached from gross fixed investment and depending 
more on other variables. The main answers provided by the financialisation literature are 
worsening wages and labor conditions, and financial accumulation. The former undoubtedly 
plays a relevant role in terms of cost management but the general validity of the second has 
been lately put into question. Other response discussed in this paper is the delocalization of 
production through global value chains which allows firms to be less dependent from their own 
production facilities and decrease costs. Increasing market power through mergers and 
acquisitions and intangible accumulation also allow firms to attain higher mark-ups, therefore 
being part of the explanation. 
Overall, this paper reinforces the need to keep on developing the multiple dimensions involved 
in the theory of the firm and leaves open questions for the future as well. The first is to what 
extent the changes described in this paper are a permanent feature of the ‘new megacorp’ or 
could be reverted when facing a context of increasing demand rather than the current 
stagnation. Second, the paper points towards the need to broaden the scope of what is 
considered to be productive investment, as Eichner (1976, pp. 88–89) had already done. Third, 
the paper also points towards the need to keep on reflecting on the changes brought about by 
the financialisation of the firm. Wood (1975, pp. 8–9), for instance, distinguished financial from 
non-financial firms based on whether they tried to maximize the present value of future earnings 
or their size, respectively. While neoclassical theory attributed the former to all firms, he saw 
this objective as belonging only to financial firms. Fourth, the empirical evidence presented in 
this paper is mainly explorative, future research should study more carefully the links between 
investment and current NFC´s capacity to deliver final goods and compete with other firms, 
tracking more carefully the evolution of those links over time as well as their sectoral 
specificities. 
This last point is of major relevance. In most macro heterodox papers, investment is usually 
modeled as depending on some measure of profits, expected growth in sales and capacity 
utilization. While this paper does not deny these links, it claims that they have been weakened 
and therefore the conclusions of those models might be flawed. 
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Figure 1. Main relations between profits and investment 
 
 












Figure 4. Rate of physical accumulation 
 
Note. Median and average of gross physical accumulation calculated as capital expenditures (Compustat 
Data Item 128) over net property, plant and equipment (Compustat Data Item 8). For the net measure, 
depreciation (Compustat Data Item 14) is subtracted from capital expenditures. US nonfinancial listed 
firms, duplicates removed. Weighted average is calculated according to the net stock of property, plant 
and equipment.  
Source. Compustat North America. 
 





Figure 6. Sales growth 
 
Note. Sales growth calculated as the difference in real yearly revenues (Compustat Data Item 12) over 
sales. Variables deflated using GDP Implicit Price Deflator (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). US 
nonfinancial listed firms, duplicates removed. Weighted average is calculated according to the net stock 
of property, plant and equipment (Compustat Data Item 8).  
Source. Compustat North America. 
 






Figure 8. The model redefined 
 
 
Figure A1. Profit Rate 
 
Note. Median and average of profit rate calculated as operating income before depreciation (Compustat 
Data Item 13) – income taxes (Compustat Data Item 16) – interest expense (Compustat Data Item 15) over 
net property, plant and equipment (Compustat Data Item 8). US nonfinancial listed firms, duplicates 
removed. Weighted average is calculated according to the net stock of property, plant and equipment.  











Figure A2. Sales growth 
 
Note. Sales growth calculated as the difference in real yearly revenues (Compustat Data Item 12) over 
capital expenditures (Compustat Data Item 128). Variables deflated using GDP Implicit Price Deflator 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). US nonfinancial listed firms with positive growth in sales, duplicates 
removed. Weighted average is calculated according to the net stock of property, plant and equipment 
(Compustat Data Item 8). Averages for years 1974 and 1991 are not included due to their extremely high 
values arising from low investment (in the figure, the values for these years would be 27.97 and 7.59 
respectively). 
Source. Compustat North America 
 
Figure A3. Sales per unit of investment 
 
Note. Sales revenues (Compustat Data Item 12) calculated over capital expenditures (Compustat Data 
Item 128). US nonfinancial listed firms, duplicates removed. Weighted average is calculated according to 
the net stock of property, plant and equipment (Compustat Data Item 8). Averages for years 1972 and 
1974 are not included due to their extremely high values arising from low investment (in the figure, the 
values for these years would be 35.61 and 61.12 respectively). 
Source. Compustat North America 
 
 
